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INTRODUCTION

During the Great Depression, Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) to establish nationwide standards for minimum wages, overtime
pay, employment-related recordkeeping, and child labor.' Still in existence
today, the FLSA applies to full-time and part-time employees who work in
the private sector as well as those who work in federal, state, and local
governments. 2 Although this eighty-year-old statute appears straightforward
on its face, a particular interpretation of the FLSA the so-called "joint
employment doctrine"-continues to cause difficulty for employers,
employees, and courts around the country.
The FLSA does not mention the term "joint employment." Rather, the
joint employment doctrine has largely evolved through various interpretations
of law by the Department of Labor (DOL)3 and federal courts. 4 Because an
employee may have more than one employer under the FLSA, two employers
can be jointly and severally liable to an employee for violations of the Act
where both employers collectively exercise the requisite control over the
particular employee. 5 How much control is necessary, and how should this
doctrine be applied? Federal courts have struggled with these questions.
Federal circuit courts have been unable to adopt a single standard for
addressing joint employment under the FLSA, resulting in a lack of
uniformity across the country. This is particularly challenging for employers
that seek to maintain the operation of a single business model within the
United States.
In a 2017 decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit adopted a new test for determining joint employment under the
FLSA. 6 Breaking away from decades of precedent, Salinas v. Commercial
Interiors laid out a seemingly low threshold for finding two putative
employers jointly and severally liable for violations of the FLSA.7 Although
only a handful of decisions have applied the Fourth Circuit's new test, legal
scholars-as well as businesses nationwide-are concerned about potential

1.
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, HANDY REFERENCE GUIDE TO
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 2 (2016), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/

whl282.pdf.
2.
Id at i.
3.
29 C.F.R. § 791.1 (2018).
4.
E.g., Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2017).
5. Id. at 133 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (2018)).
6. Id. at 140.
7.
Id- at 141-42.
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liabilities that may result from this expansive interpretation of joint
employment.'
The Fourth Circuit's joint employment test under the FLSA threatens
traditional business practices because its low threshold results in
unpredictability for business decision making and increases the risk of
significant liabilities for businesses. 9 Part II of this Note discusses the history
of the FLSA, including its enactment by Congress, the origin of the joint
employment doctrine, and why it remains important today. Part III discusses
how courts, particularly federal circuit courts, have applied different tests to
decide this critical employment and labor law issue, including the Fourth
Circuit's recent test from Salinas. Finally, Part IV discusses potential flaws
with the Fourth Circuit's new test and how it may have detrimental effects on
business practices across the country, while specifically focusing on impacts
within the states located in the Fourth Circuit.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

CongressEnacts the FLSA

Advances in manufacturing processes in the United States during the
1920s caused many Americans to move from rural to urban areas, resulting in
a substantial increase in employment levels.' 0 An increase in both workers
seeking employment and production efficiency led to employers possessing
more bargaining power over the terms of workers' employment." Initially,
some states enacted legislation to combat the bargaining inequality and its
resulting consequences; however, by the mid-1930s, many people believed
that a federal law was necessary to address the growing problem.12
By 1933, employment levels had dropped substantially in the United
States, further increasing employers' bargaining power over terms of

8.
See, e.g., Nancy Van der Veer Holt, B. Patrice Clair & Jacquelyn L. Thompson,
Fourth Circuit Creates New Joint Employment Test Under the Fair Labor Standards Acts,
FORDHARRISON (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.fordharrison.com/fourth-circuit-creates-newjoint-employment-test-under-the-fair-labor-standards-act.

9.

Id.

10. Sarah L. Santos, Note, The FairLabor Standards Act-Where the Fourth Circuit
Went Wrong in Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington: JudicialExpansion of
FairLabor Standards Act Exemptions to Include Ministerial Employees, 28 W. NEW ENG. L.
REv. 369, 372 (2006) (citing Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the FairLabor

StandardsAct, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 19, 97-98 (2000)).
11. Id.
12.

Id. at 373 (citing Harris, supra note 10, at 20).
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employment.' 3 That year, President Franklin Roosevelt persuaded Congress
to adopt the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which delegated
administrative authority to the National Recovery Administration (NRA).14
The NRA enforced fair-trade codes by suspending antitrust laws, which
resulted in less competition for jobs and higher wages for workers.' 5 In an
effort to promote the purposes of the Act, President Roosevelt encouraged
businesses to adopt Reemployment Agreements which set limits on workweek
hours and established a minimum wage.' 6 The NRA gave employers who
signed these agreements a marketing incentive, designating them as "Blue
Eagle" businesses.' 7 The NRA encouraged Americans to buy products only
from these businesses," and it even ran advertisements that encouraged
consumers to boycott products made by businesses that refused to sign
Reemployment Agreements.' 9
Two years later, the United States Supreme Court dealt the NIRA a
devastating blow.20 In A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 2 1 the

court invalidated both the NIRA's restrictive trade practices and its labor
provisions, reasoning that the NIRA "was an unconstitutional delegation of
government power to private interests." 22 In Morehead v. N. Y. ex rel
Tipaldo,23 the Supreme Court took additional measures, ruling that both
federal and state governments were barred from enacting minimum wage
statutes. 24

Despite consistent opposition by the Supreme Court, President Roosevelt
was determined to enact legislation that would improve the lives of working
people and survive judicial scrutiny. 25 As the United States economy was
beginning to recover from the Great Depression, President Roosevelt
nominated Frances Perkins to become the Secretary of Labor. 26 Perkins

13. See Harris,supra note 10, at 99.
14. Deborah C. Malamud, Engineeringthe Middle Classes: Class Line-Drawing in New
Deal Hours Legislation, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2212, 2245 (1998).
15. Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a
Minimum Wage, 101 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 22, 22 (1978).
16. Id. at 22-23.
17. Id. at 23.
18. Id.
19. Malamud, supra note 14, at 2256.
20. Grossman, supra note 15, at 23.
21. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
22. Id.; A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 542.
23. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
24. Morehead, 298 U.S. at 610-11; Howard D. Samuel, Troubled Passage: The Labor
Movement and the FairLabor Standards Act, 123 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 32, 34 (2000).
25. Samuel, supra note 24, at 34.
26. Grossman, supra note 15, at 24.
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agreed to accept the nomination on the condition that the President would
allow her to advocate for a national law incorporating minimum wage,
overtime pay, and abolishing child labor.27 When the President agreed,
Perkins then asked him, "Have you considered that to launch such a
program ... might be considered unconstitutional?" 2 8 Roosevelt replied,
"[w]ell, we can work out something when the time comes." 2 9
Secretary Perkins then drafted a bill that would use the federal
government's purchasing power to promote compliance with labor
standards. 30 The purpose of the bill was to require employers with government
contracts "to conform to certain labor conditions in the performance of the
contracts." 3' Specifically, to receive government contracts, companies were
required to agree to pay a minimum wage, enforce a forty-hour week, and
adhere to child labor standards established in the statute.3 2 President
Roosevelt and Secretary Perkins were disheartened when they discovered that
many government contracts actually encouraged the exploitation of unfair
labor practices.33 To address this situation, President Roosevelt advocated
for-and Congress approved the Public Contracts Act of 1936.34 Unlike the
decision in Schechter Corp., the Supreme Court held that the Public Contracts
Act was not "an exercise by Congress of regulatory power over private
business or employment." 35 Although limited by judicial scrutiny and narrow
interpretations, the Public Contracts Act established a framework for future
legislation aimed at curbing unfair labor practices across all industries. 36
After successfully adopting labor standards for federal government
contracts, Roosevelt and Perkins focused their efforts on obtaining legislation
to establish labor standards for the private sector. 37 An early version of the
proposed FLSA only applied to hours worked and wages earned by
employees. 38 Roosevelt craftily inserted a provision to establish child labor
standards, which was popular in Congress. 39 The provision used the

27. Id.
28. Id. (citing FRANCES PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW 152 (1946)).
29. Id. (citing FRANCES PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW 152 (1946)).
30. Id.
31. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 128 (1940) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 742946 (1936)).
32. Grossman, supra note 15, at 24 (requiring businesses to employ only boys over the
age of sixteen and girls over the age of eighteen).
33. Id.
34. Id.; see also 41 U.S.C. § 6501, et seq. (originally at 41 U.S.C. 35, et seq.).
35. Perkins, 310 U.S. at 128.
36. Grossman, supra note 15, at 24.
37. Samuel, supra note 24, at 34.
38. Grossman, supra note 15, at 25.
39. Id.
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Commerce Clause in Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution as
the authority to ban the sale of goods traveling across state lines that were
produced by children under the age of sixteen; Roosevelt used this authority
as the basis to get the entire act, including the wage and hour provisions,
through Congress.40
In essence, the bill provided for a minimum wage of forty-cents per hour,
a maximum workweek of forty hours, and a minimum working age of sixteen
for most industries. 4' Workers in agriculture, transportation, retail, and public
employees were exempt from the FLSA.42 From July of 1937 until June of
1938, both houses of Congress engaged in a number of "legislative battles,"
including seventy-two proposed amendments to the Administration's bill. 43 A

significant area of conflict was whether the FLSA should have "a fixed
universal standard" or create a labor board to "establish standards on an
industry basis." 44 After many compromises on a variety of issues, Congress
passed the bill and President Roosevelt signed the FLSA into law on June 25,
1938.45 The final Act established an initial minimum wage of twenty-five
cents an hour, increasing to forty-cents an hour within seven years. 46
Similarly, the Act fixed the maximum number of hours in a workweek without
overtime pay at forty-four, which would decrease to forty hours within three
years.47

B.

Origin ofJoint Employment Under the FLSA

Just one year after the FLSA was enacted, the DOL introduced the
concept of joint employment in response to employers attempting to avoid
complying with the law. 48 These employers were called "wage chiselers." 49

Wage chiselers circumvented compliance by creating separate businessesalthough separate only in name-to assign their employees' hours worked that
would otherwise constitute overtime.5o The DOL realized the negative effects

40. See id. (outlining President Roosevelt's effective message to Congress).
41. Id.
42. Samuel, supra note 24, at 36.
43. Grossman, supra note 15, at 28.
44. Samuel, supra note 24, at 36.
45. Grossman, supra note 15, at 28.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Jason Schwartz & Ryan Stewart, FLSA Turns 80: The Divide over Joint Employment
Status, LAW360 (June 18, 2018, 12:49 PM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/1048614/flsaturns-80-the-divide-over-joint-employment-status.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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that wage chiselers had on the overarching purpose of the FLSA and began to
establish administrative interpretations to guide courts in combatting the
issue.'
In 1958, the DOL adopted section 791.2 in the Code of Federal
Regulations. 52 This section clarified that one individual may be employed by
more than one employer under the FLSA, 53 and the United States Supreme
Court has agreed with this interpretation. 54 Additionally, section 791.2
included the following guideline explaining what constitutes joint
employment:
A determination of whether the employment by the employers is to
be considered joint employment or separate and distinct employment
for purposes of the act depends upon all the facts in the particular
case. If all the relevant facts establish that two or more employers are
acting entirely independently of each other and are completely
disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular
employee, who during the same workweek performs work for more
than one employer, each employer may disregard all work performed
by the employee for the other employer (or employers) in
determining his own responsibilities under the Act. On the other
hand, if the facts establish that the employee is employed jointly by
two or more employers, i.e., that employment by one employer is not
completely disassociated from employment by the other employer(s),
all of the employee's work for all of the joint employers during the
workweek is considered as one employment for purposes of the
Act.5 5

Although section 791.2 provides courts some guidance when interpreting
the Act, the regulation's vague language and vast factual differences across
joint employment disputes have resulted in courts struggling to formulate a
workable test for determining joint employer liability.
Another reason that this topic remains unsettled is clear: the FLSA does
not define "Joint Employment." 56 In fact, the term is never mentioned in the
statute.57

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (2018).
Id. § 791.2(a).
Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195 (1973) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2018)).
29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a).
Id.
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2018); Schwartz & Stewart, supra note 48.
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Why Does Joint Employment Matter?

There are two reasons why joint employment liability under the FLSA is
important to business decision-making in the twenty-first century. First, the
joint employment doctrine considers a worker's two or more joint employers
as a "single employer" for purposes of deciding whether the single employer
adhered to the FLSA wage and overtime requirements.58 For example,
suppose employee Z works twenty-five hours in a week for company X and
another twenty-five hours in the same week for company Y. Under this
scenario, assuming X and Y are separate employers, each company will owe
Z her hourly rate for twenty-five hours of work. On the other hand, if a court
determines that X and Y are Z's joint employer, then Z's hours will be
aggregated, and Z will have worked fifty hours for the single employer (X and
Y). As a result, under these facts, Z will likely receive more pay because the
FLSA requires overtime compensation for most employees working over
forty hours in a week.
Second, the joint employment doctrine is important because it "holds joint
employers jointly and severally liable for any violations of the FLSA." 59 To
illustrate, in the above hypothetical scenario where X and Y are joint
employers, if X becomes insolvent, then Y can be held fully liable for payment
of Z's fifty hours of wages.
III. COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF JOINT EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE FLSA

A.

CourtInterpretationsBefore Salinas

Prior to Salinas, federal courts predominantly analyzed joint employment
based on some variation of one of two tests-or a combination of the two. 60
The first test applies common law agency principles to make joint
employment determinations, while the second test known as the "economic
realities test"-focuses on an employee's economic dependence on a putative
joint employer. 6' Although different factors and points of emphasis are
evaluated under each test, the ultimate goal of both tests is to determine how

58. Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 134 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing
Schultz v. Capital Int'l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 305, 307, 310 (4th Cir. 2006)).
59. Id. (citing Schultz, 466 F.3d at 310); 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a).
60. Br. for American Hotel & Lodging Ass'n & Asian American Hotel Owners Ass'n et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Pet'rs at 6, DIRECTV, LLC v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 635 (July 6,2017)
(No. 16-1449) [hereinafter Brief I].
61. Id.
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much control a putative employer must have over the direct employer's
employee to establish joint employment.62
Acknowledging that the FLSA's definition of "employ" is extremely
vague, 63 some courts have relied on common law agency principles for
determining joint employment relationships. 64 The FLSA defines "employ"
as "to suffer or permit to work." 65 Because of this recognizably broad and
ambiguous definition, courts have looked to restatements of the laws for
guidance. 66 Under the Restatement (First)ofAgency, "[a] servant is a person
employed to perform service for another in his affairs and who . . . is subject

to the other's control or right to control." 67 In Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co.,
the Second Circuit held that a traditional agency relationship will warrantjoint
employer liability; however, circumstances outside of an agency relationship
68
may also result in liability.

Perhaps the more common approach, or at least a larger portion of the
mixed tests used by different courts, is the economic realities test. 69 The

economic realities test incorporates both agency principles and factors
pertaining to the worker's financial dependence. 70 The key inquiry under this
standard is "whether the individual is economically dependent on the business
to which he renders service or is, as a matter of economic fact, in business for
himself." 7 In a joint employment dispute, this inquiry focuses on whether a
worker is economically dependent on a putative joint employer.72
The economic realities test was originally derived from the Ninth
Circuit's four-factor test in Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare
Agency. 73 The Bonnette factors included: "whether the alleged employer (1)

had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled
employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the
rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment records." 74

62. Id.
63. Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(g) (2018)); United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 n.3 (1945).
64. Id.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
66. Zheng, 355 F.3d at 69.
67. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1993).
68. Zheng, 355 F.3d at 69.
69. Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983).
70. See id.
71. Doty v. Elias, 733 F.2d 720, 722-23 (10th Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted)
(citing Donovan v. Tehco, Inc., 642 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1981)).
72. Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 136 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Layton v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 686 F.3d 1172, 1176-77 (11th Cir. 2012)).
73. Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470.
74. Id.
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Although these factors resemble agency principles, many courts have adopted
the Bonnette factors and also added factors of their own to clarify the
economic realities aspect of joint employment. In sum, most courts use a
combination of the two tests in joint employment disputes, while analyzing
the relationship between the worker and the putative joint employer.7 5
1.

First Circuit

For purposes of joint employment under the FLSA, the First Circuit
adheres to the four-factor test from Bonnette.76 In Baystate Alternative
Staffing v. Herman, the court rejected a joint employment analysis solely
grounded in common law definitions, and instead focused the analysis on "the
totality of the circumstances bearing on whether the putative employee is
economically dependent on the alleged employer." 7 7 The court held that the
Bonnette factors "provide a useful framework" for making such
determinations.71
2.

Second Circuit

The Second Circuit focuses its inquiry on the putative employer's
"functional control" over the employee. 79 The court adopted a six-factor test,
derived from Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., which considers: (1) whether the
putative employer owns the work premises and equipment; (2) whether the
nature of the business allows shifting "as a unit from one putative joint
employer to another;" (3) whether the worker performed a specific job that
was an integral part of the putative employer's production process; (4)
whether job functions under particular contracts could pass from one
employer to another without material effects; (5) how much supervision the
putative employer exerted over the worker; and (6) whether the work was
performed "exclusively or predominantly" for the putative employer.s 0

75. Brief I, supra note 60, at 8.
76. Baystate Alt. Staffing, Inc. v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 675 (1st Cir. 1998); Bonnette,
704 F.2d at 1470.
77. Baystate, 163 F.3d at 675.
78. Id.
79. Grenawalt v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 642 Fed. Appx. 36, 38 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting
Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 2003)).
80. Id.
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Third Circuit

In analyzing joint employment under the FLSA, the Third Circuit uses a
variation of the economic realities test." In addition to the four-factor
Bonnette test, the Third Circuit considers whether the putative employer is
routinely involved in employee discipline.82 Otherwise, this circuit appears to
83
apply the general analysis set out by the Bonnette court.

4.

Fourth Circuit

Before Salinas, the Fourth Circuit adopted a two-step test for joint
employment under the FLSA in Schultz v. Capital International Security,
Inc.84 Under the Schultz framework, courts first decided whether to treat two
entities as joint employers. 5 For this step, Schultz identified the DOL
regulation discussed in section II.B. as a basis for answering the inquiry;
however, the court did not specify particular factors to be considered. 86 For
the second step, courts in this circuit analyze whether the putative worker was
"an employee or independent contractor of the combined entity, if they were
joint employers, or each entity, ifthey are separate employers."" In answering
this second question, Schultz established the following six factors:
(1) the degree of control that the putative employer has over the
manner in which the work is performed; (2) the worker's
opportunities for profit or loss dependent on his managerial skill; (3)
the worker's investment in equipment or material, or his employment
of other workers; (4) the degree of skill required for the work; (5) the
permanence of the working relationship; and (6) the degree to which
the services rendered are an integral part of the putative employer's
business.8

81. Brief I, supra note 60, at 11 (citing In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp't
Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 469 (3d Cir. 2012)).
82. In re Enter., 683 F.3d at 469.
83. Id. at 470.
84. Schultz v. Capital Int'l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 305-07 (4th Cir. 2006).
85. Id. at 305-06.
86. Id.
87. Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 140 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing
Schultz, 466 F.3d at 305-07).
88. Schultz, 466 F.3d at 304-05.
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These factors appear to be a variation of the economic realities test. 89 As
discussed in section III.B., Salinas adopted the general two-step framework
from Schultz, as well as the six factors used in considering the second prong. 90
However, unlike in Schultz, the court in Salinas created new factors for the
first prong and changed the focal point of the entire analysis. 9
5.

Fifth Circuit

Much like the First Circuit, the Fifth Circuit strictly applies the Bonnette
factors; 92 however, in Orozco v. Plackis, the court noted that an individual
need not establish all four factors in every case. 93 Additionally, the Court
focused its analysis by quoting an earlier Fifth Circuit decision which stated
that "[t]he dominant theme in the case law is that those who have operating
control over employees within companies may be individually liable for
FLSA violations committed by the companies." 94 Ultimately, the Orozco
court held that in joint employment disputes under the FLSA, the economic
realities test applies. 95
6.

Sixth Circuit

The Sixth Circuit has not addressed joint employment under the FLSA;
therefore, the law in this circuit is unsettled. 96 However, a district court in the
circuit used three of the four Bonnette factors in deciding a related dispute,
simply omitting the factor dealing with recordkeeping. 97 Consequently, it
appears that the Sixth Circuit may follow an abridged version of the economic
realities test. 98

89. See id. at 305.
90. Salinas, 848 F.3d at 139, 141-42.
91. Id at 150.
92. Brief I, supra note 60, at 12 (citing Orozco v. Plackis, 757 F.3d 445, 448 (5th Cir.
2014)).
93. Orozco, 757 F.3d at 448 (citing Gray v. Powers, 673 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2012)).
94. Id. (quoting Martin v. Spring Break '83 Prods., LLC, 688 F.3d 247, 251 (5th Cir.
2012)).
95. Id. (citing Gray, 673 F.3d at 354).
96. Bacon v. Subway Sandwiches & Salads, LLC, No. 3:14-CV-192-PLR-HBG, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19572, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2015).
97. Id. (citing Politron v. Worldwide Domestic Serv., LLC., No. 3-11-0028, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 52999, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. May 17, 2011)).
98. See id. (citing Politron, at *4).
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Seventh Circuit

In Moldenhauer v. Tazewell-Pekin Consolidated Communications
Center,99 the Seventh Circuit addressed joint employment in the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) context.'o The court noted that it makes sense
for the FLSA joint employment standard to apply in the FMLA context
because the text of the FMLA mirrors that of the FLSA.' However, the court
did not adopt any specific factors and generally held that "for a joint-employer
relationship to exist, each alleged employer must exercise control over the
working conditions of the employee, although the ultimate determination will
vary depending on the specific facts of each case."' 02 This interpretation may
be consistent with the common law agency approach.
8.

Eighth Circuit

The Eighth Circuit has not adopted a test for determining joint
employment under the FLSA. 0 3 Nevertheless, a district court decision
indicates that the circuit court may follow an abridged version of the Bonnette
test, and by simply omitting the fourth factor from consideration, the circuit's
approach is almost identical to that taken by the district court in the Sixth
Circuit. 104
9.

Ninth Circuit

The Ninth Circuit uses a test that incorporates both the Bonnette factors
and the Second Circuit's six factors for determining joint employment under
the FLSA; this test consists of thirteen factors. o The first five factors
resemble the four factors from Bonnette, which the Ninth Circuit identified as
"regulatory factors."1 06 Six of the final eight factors are almost identical to the
Second Circuit's factors, which the court refers to as "non-regulatory

99. 536 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2008).
100. Id at 641.
101. Id at 644.
102. Id
103. Brief I, supra note 60, at 14.
104. Ash v. Anderson Merchandisers, LLC, 799 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 2015) (reasoning
that the plaintiffs' complaint did not state facts consistent with economic realities of
employment, "such as their alleged employers' right to control the nature and quality of their
work, the employers' right to hire or fire, or the source of compensation for their work").
105. See Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 639-40 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Brief I,
supra note 60, at 14-15.
106. See Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 639-40.
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factors." o 7 The final two factors are derived from Real v. DriscollStrawberry
Associates, Inc. 108 These two factors consider "'whether the service rendered
requires a specific skill' and "whether the employee has an 'opportunity for
profit or loss depending upon [the alleged employee's] managerial skill."'1 09
In essence, this test is a combination of the economic realities test and
common law agency principles, which consider the amount of control
exercised by the putative employer.
10. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit has not identified a specific test for determining joint
employment under the FLSA."10 Nonetheless, a district court within the
circuit has applied a test incorporating both the Bonnette factors and common
law agency principles."' In justifying application of the Bonnette factors, the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado reasoned that the
Tenth Circuit has applied the economic realities test in similar joint
employment disputes, outside of the FLSA." 2
11. Eleventh Circuit

"

The Eleventh Circuit uses an eight-factor test, which incorporates the
economic realities test from Bonnette, two control factors from the Second
Circuit, and one additional factor.11 3 The two control factors are whether the
putative employer owns the work facility and whether the putative employee
performs a specialized job that is essential to the employer's business. 114
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit also considers "the amount of investment in
equipment and facilities by the land owner versus the contractor."

107. See id. at 640.
108. Id. at 640 (citing Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th
Cir. 1979)).
109. Id. (citation omitted).
I10. Brief I, supra note 60, at 15.
111. See Coldwell v. RiteCorp Envtl. Prop. Sols., No. 16-ccv-01998-NYW, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 68252, at *14-16 (D. Colo. May 4, 2017).
112. Id. at *12-13.
113. See Garcia-Celestino v. Ruiz Harvesting, Inc., 843 F.3d 1276, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016);
see also Brief I, supra note 60, at 15-16.
114. See Garcia-Celestino,898 F.3d at 1294.
115. Id.
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12. D.C. Circuit
The D.C. Circuit has also not adopted a specific test for FLSA joint
employment. 116 However, much like the other circuits without a concrete test,
a district court within the circuit has applied a test combining the Bonnette
factors and the Second Circuit's factors." 7 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit may
be inclined to adopt a test incorporating both the economic realities test and
common law agency principles.
B. Salinas v. Commercial Interiors
In 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
established a new joint employment test after hearing arguments in Salinas v.
Commercial Interiors."8 In hindsight, Salinas represents a significant
departure from how courts interpret joint employment relationships and
employer liability, rejecting the basic framework applied in every other
circuit. The analytical change can best be explained by two common law
doctrines: vertical and horizontal joint employment." 9 Vertical joint
employment, the approach taken by every circuit addressing the issue before
Salinas, focuses the overall inquiry on whether the worker is economically
dependent on the putative joint employer.' 2 0 Alternatively, horizontal joint
employment, adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Salinas, focuses the overall
inquiry not on the worker's relationship with one employer, but on the
relationship between the two putative joint employers.121
The facts in Salinas were typical of those seen in many joint employment
disputes, involving an assertion that a general contractor is liable under the
FLSA for wages due to a subcontractor's employees.1 22 J.I. General
Contractors, Inc. (J.I.), the subcontractor, directly employed each of the four
plaintiffs as drywall installation workers. 123 Commercial Interiors, Inc.
(Commercial), the general contractor, dealt primarily in "interior finishing
services, including drywall installation, carpentry, framing, and hardware

116. See Ivanov v. Sunset Pools Mgmt., Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 189, 194-95 (D.D.C. 2008);
Brief I, supra note 60, at 16.
117. See Ivanov, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 194-95.
118. Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 140 (4th Cir. 2017).
119. Murphy v. Heartshare Human Servs. of N.Y., 254 F. Supp. 3d 392, 396 (E.D.N.Y.
2017).
120. See id (citing U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter 2016 WL
284582, at *4 (Jan. 20, 2016)).
121. See id. at 397.
122. Salinas, 848 F.3d at 129.
123. Id. at 130.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 12
1140

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.70: 1125

installation." 2 4 At the time of the litigation, J.I. was defunct; but, when
operating, J.I. and its employees primarily worked for Commercial
Interiors.1 25 The complaint alleged that Commercial and J.I. jointly employed
the plaintiffs, so both employers were jointly and severally liable for FLSA
violations, and hours worked for each employer should be aggregated to
calculate the plaintiffs' damages under the statute. 126 The United States
District Court for the District of Maryland granted Commercial's summary
judgment motion, holding the plaintiffs were not jointly employed by
Commercial because J.I. and Commercial had a legitimate business
relationship, and neither employer attempted to avoid FLSA compliance.1 27
In reversing the lower court's decision, the Fourth Circuit created a new
test for joint employment under the FLSA.1 28 Although Salinas reaffirmed the
broad two-step framework from Schultz,1 29 the Salinas test completely
changed the focal point of joint employment analysis. 3 0 Specifically, the key
distinction between Schultz and Salinas is that the court in Schultz like every
other related decision utilized the economic realities test, focusing on the
worker's economic dependence on the single putative employer. 3 ' In
contrast, the Salinas court focused the entire analysis on answering one
fundamental question: whether two or more employers are "'not completely
disassociated' with regard to their codetermination of the key terms and
conditions of a worker's employment." 3 2 Simply put, Salinas instructs courts
primarily to focus on the relationship between the two putative joint
employers, even where a worker is not an employee of either putative
"

employer.

Moreover, the Salinas court laid out six factors for courts to consider in
analyzing the first prong of the two-step framework:

124. Id. at 129.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 140.
129. The first prong of the test states that joint employment exists when "two or more
persons or entities share, agree to allocate responsibility for, or otherwise codetermineformally or informally, directly or indirectly the essential terms and conditions of a worker's
employment." Id. at 129-30 (citing Schultz v. Capital Int'l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 305-07 (4th
Cir. 2006)). The second prong stipulates that "the two entities' combined influence over the
essential terms and conditions of the worker's employment render the worker an employee as
opposed to an independent contractor." Id. at 30.
130. See id. at 140-41.
131. Schultz v. Capital Int'l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 305 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Henderson
v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., 41 F.3d 567, 570 (10th Cir. 1994)).
132. Salinas, 848 F.3d at 143.
133. Id at 142-43.
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(1) Whether, formally or as a matter of practice, the putative joint
employers jointly determine, share, or allocate the power to direct,
control, or supervise the worker, whether by direct or indirect means;
(2) Whether, formally or as a matter of practice, the putative joint
employers jointly determine, share, or allocate the power to-directly
or indirectly hire or fire the worker or modify the terms or
conditions of the worker's employment; (3) The degree of
permanency and duration of the relationship between the putative
joint employers; (4) Whether, through shared management or a direct
or indirect ownership interest, one putative joint employer controls,
is controlled by, or is under common control with the other putative
joint employer; (5) Whether the work is performed on a premises
owned or controlled by one or more of the putative joint employers,
independently or in connection with one another; and (6) Whether,
formally or as a matter of practice, the putative joint employers
jointly determine, share, or allocate responsibility over functions
ordinarily carried out by an employer, such as handling payroll;
providing workers' compensation insurance; paying payroll taxes; or
providing the facilities, equipment, tools, or materials necessary to
complete the work. 134
The court noted these six factors are not an exclusive list of all relevant
inquiries and "[t]he ultimate determination ofjoint employment must be based
upon the circumstances of the whole activity."1 35 Additionally, the court
emphasized one factor alone can support a finding that two putative employers
are "not completely disassociated."1 36 In analyzing the second prong, the
court held the ultimate determination is whether the joint employers'
combined influence renders the worker an employee or independent
contractor.1 37 To answer this question, the court adopted the six factors laid
out in Schultz.1 38

In its twenty-six-page opinion, the Fourth Circuit completed an in-depth
analysis, explaining why the Ninth Circuit's Bonnette factors-including
those applied by the Salinas district court provided a flawed interpretation
of FLSA joint employment and why their new approach was justified. 139 The
Fourth Circuit's explicit rejection of the Bonnette factors, and all FLSA joint

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 141-42.
Id. at 142 (quoting Schultz, 466 F.3d at 306).
Id.
See id. at 150.
Id. (citing Schultz, 466 F.3d at 304-05).
See id. at 129-30.
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employer tests derived from Bonnette, can be summarized in three points.1 40
First, the court states that Bonnette incorrectly relies on common law agency
principles because Congress intended for FLSA protection to reach workers
who may not otherwise qualify as employees "under a strict application of
traditional agency law principles."141 Second, and arguably most significant,
Bonnette focuses on vertical joint employment rather than horizontal joint
employment.1 42 Relying on the 1958 DOL regulation discussed in section
II.B., the court reasoned that focusing on the worker's relationship with the
putative employer does not solve the ultimate issue of whether the putative
employer is "'not completely disassociated' from employment by the other
employer[] ."143 Finally, the Salinas court states that Bonnette inadequately
views "joint employment as a question of economic dependency."1 44 The
court reasoned although the Bonnette factors properly distinguish an
employment relationship from an independent contractor relationship, they do
not cover key situations in which two employers are "not completely
disassociated" from each other; therefore, they do not cover some situations
where liability is justified under the FLSA. 145
After rejecting Bonnette and adopting its new test, the Salinas court
pointed to thirteen specific facts in the record which supported its conclusion
that J.I. and Commercial jointly employed the plaintiffs.1 46 In determining
joint employment under the FLSA, the court found the first factor favored the
plaintiffs because "Commercial and J.I. jointly directed, supervised, and
controlled Plaintiffs." 147 Specifically, Commercial required the plaintiffs to
attend mandatory meetings, where they received feedback and various types
of training, including work quality and safety procedures.1 48 Commercial also
required both J.I. supervisors and the plaintiffs to wear branded clothing with
49
a Commercial logo.1

Regarding the second factor, the court reasoned although J.I.
predominantly hired and fired its workers, Commercial decided the plaintiffs'
work schedules and determined when working overtime hours was
appropriate.150 The court then simultaneously analyzed the third and fourth

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See id. at 139.
Id. at 136 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992)).
See id. at 139.
Id. at 137 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (2018)).
Id. at 139.
Id.
Id. at 145-46.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id. at 147.
Id.
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factors, considering the permanency of the relationship between J.I. and
Commercial as well as Commercial's control over J.I."' The court pointed to
evidence of the "longstanding business relationship" between the two
companies and the fact that J.I. contracted almost exclusively with
Commercial. 152
The fifth factor also favored joint employment because Commercial
controlled every jobsite where the plaintiffs worked. 5 3 Commercial also
instructed the plaintiffs "to sign in and out of the jobsite with Commercial
foremen[.]"1 5 4 The final factor favored joint employment because
Commercial provided the plaintiffs with all job tools and equipment required
for drywall installation. " Although J.I. controlled most aspects of the
plaintiffs' payroll, Commercial also kept records of the hours that the
plaintiffs worked.15 6

After determining that Commercial and J.I. were "not completely
disassociated" regarding the plaintiffs' employment, the court moved to the
second prong of the Schultz analysis."' Considering Commercial and J.I. a
single employer, the court then held the plaintiffs were employees of the lone
employer as opposed to independent contractors. " The court was very
concise in analyzing the second prong, briefly referencing the Schultz factors
and the economic dependence threshold. 5 9 In short, the court reasoned the
plaintiffs' economic dependence on J.I. was apparent because their
employment by J.I. was not disputed, and therefore, "they were necessarily
economically dependent on Commercial and J.I. in the aggregate."1 60
In sum, the Salinas decision completely changed how courts, at least
those within the Fourth Circuit, interpret joint employment under the
FLSA.161 Shifting the focal point of analysis to the relationship between the
putative employers will likely have continued effects on how businesses
operate within the Fourth Circuit, particularly on the ways businesses organize
to perform their work efficiently while also complying with the FLSA.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 151.
See id. at 150-51.
Id. at 150.
See id. at 137.
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IV. SALINAS: EFFECTS ON BUSINESS PRACTICES

The Fourth Circuit's new joint employment test under the FLSA may be
harmful to business practices both within the circuit-and across the
country because its low threshold leads to unpredictable outcomes, creates
a lack of uniformity across federal circuits, and threatens to undermine many
traditional business relationships. Because Salinas was decided recently,
perhaps the greatest impacts from this new test are still unclear; however,
countless businesses are concerned their traditional relationships and practices
may create new liability and financial risks. The foreseeable business
practices in jeopardy include franchise, independent contracting, and thirdparty arrangements.1 62 These types of relationships are often present across
large and small businesses in almost every industry, including: warehousing,
logistics,
staffing
agencies,
construction,
hospitality,
and
telecommunications. 163 Businesses utilize these arrangements to minimize
costs and maximize efficiency and flexibility, which in turn not only benefits
the company, but employees and consumers as well.1 64
A.

Unpredictability

Courts have long recognized the obvious value of predictable outcomes
for businesses making both long-term investment and everyday operational
decisions. 165 Although the court in Salinas asserts that its new test clears up
confusion in joint employment under the FLSA,1 66 the test arguably leads to
more confusion, and in turn, unpredictability because of its low threshold for
liability. Specifically, the test's first prong questions: "whether two or more
entities are 'not completely disassociated' with respect to a worker's
employment."1 67 This language implies that a single fact-one which links
two putative employers to a worker's employment constitutes sufficient
evidence to establish joint employer liability. For example, suppose a food
distributor hires a third-party cleaning service to clean its warehouse after
each shift and only asks that the cleaning service arrive during a two-hour
time window to avoid conflicts with their distribution schedule. Under a literal

162. Br. for Equal Employment Advisory Council as Amici Curiae Supporting Pet'rs at
15-17, DIRECTV, LLC v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 635 (July 2017) (No. 16-1449).
163. Id. at 16.
164. Id.
165. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) ("Predictability is valuable to
corporations making business and investment decisions.").
166. See Salinas, 848 F.3d at 140.
167. Id. at 142.
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interpretation of the first prong's language, the food distributor risks joint
employer liability for specifying when the cleaning contractor performs its
work.
Conversely, regarding the first prong, the court states in its opinion
... or, put differently, [the putative employers] share or codetermine the
essential terms and conditions of a worker's employment."1 68 Under this
interpretation, where "terms" and "conditions" are both used in a plural
context, the court seems to imply that multiple facts pointing towards joint
employment are required to link two putative joint employers together.
Applying this language to the food distributor example, providing a two-hour
window for the cleaner contractors to work may not be enough to establish
liability because the food distributor is simply requiring one condition of the
cleaners. The court attempts to reconcile these two conflicting points by
elaborating on how future courts should apply the first prong, stating one
factor in favor of joint employment may be enough in one particular case but
not in a different case.1 69

Although the court attempts to clarify these two interpretations, future
courts in the Fourth Circuit will inevitably have a difficult time applying this
vague test. Consequently, businesses located in the Fourth Circuit are left with
a confusing and unpredictable standard for complying with the FLSA.
Because both current and projected costs affect almost every business
decision, businesses forming new contractual agreements will have a more
difficult time not only negotiating prices for goods and/or services, but also
deciding whether entering into such a business agreement is worth the risk of
additional liability under the FLSA. Specifically, at the outset of these
relationships, businesses will have a difficult time predicting whether the
particular contract terms will establish joint employment under the FLSA.
Moreover, the unpredictable aspects of this test-and how they affect
business decisions-is only enhanced by the shifting political climate in
Washington, D.C. During the Obama administration, the DOL issued two
administrative interpretations regarding joint employment, which were seen
by many as "employee-friendly."' The first administrative interpretation,

168. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
169. See id. at 142 n.10 (reiterating that joint employment analysis is "highly factual" and
"while one factor supported by significant facts pointing to two or more entities'
codetermination of the key terms and conditions of a worker's employment may be sufficient to
establish that the entities are joint employers, another factor with weaker factual support may
not be").
170. Michael Cardman, DOL Withdraws Guidance on Joint Employment andIndependent
Contractors, XPERTHR (June 14, 2017), https://www.xperthr.com/news/dol-withdrawsguidance-on-joint-employment-and-independent-contractors/26468/?keywords=joint+
employment.
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issued in 2015, used the "economic dependence" approach to determine
whether an individual was an employee or independent contractor; many saw
this as creating a presumption of employment even where an apparent
independent contractor relationship existed.' 7 In 2016, the DOL introduced
a second interpretation, perhaps even more detrimental to businesses, which
stated that joint employment often exists when businesses use third-party
management companies, staffing agencies, and independent contractors.1 72
First, it is important to note that both of these administrative
interpretations were issued by the DOL while litigation in Salinas was
occurring. Second, these interpretations may have had at least some effect on
the test adopted by the Salinas court.1 73 That being said, approximately four
months after Salinas was decided, the DOL withdrew both administrative
interpretations.1 74 Furthering the political effect argument, both of these DOL
interpretations were withdrawn just months after President Trump took
office. 175 Finally, although administrative interpretations do not bind courts
or change existing case law, the withdrawal of these proposed interpretations
may provide at least some guidance as to the direction DOL policy on joint
employment is headed, especially if the Trump administration continues for a
second term. 176
The shifting political climate leads to unpredictability for how joint
employment cases will be decided in the future-and consequently may
force businesses to forgo longer contractual relationships in favor of shorter
relationships. For example, suppose a general contractor in the construction
industry has a choice of a five or ten-year contractual agreement with a
subcontractor performing electrical work. The general contractor obviously
would like to ensure that the subcontractor provides quality work, but in the
current state, the general contractor may risk joint employer liability if it
engages in too much quality control oversight. Therefore, instead of becoming
directly involved in the quality control of the subcontractor's work, the
general contractor may be forced to pay the subcontractor more money to
ensure the subcontractor employs its own quality control expert. As a result,
the general contractor may seek a shorter contract term with the hope that new

.

171. Id
172. Id
173. See id. ("The interpretations had repackaged existing case law and regulations . .
174. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Administrator Interpretations Letter-Fair
Labor Standards Act, https://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminlntrprtnFLSA.htm#foot (last
visited May 8, 2019) [hereinafter Administrator Interpretations Letter].
175. Ryan Teague Beckwith, The Year in Trump: Memorable Moments from the
President'sFirst Year in Office, TIME (Jan. 11, 2018), http://time.com/5097411 /donald-trumpfirst-year-office-timeline.
176. See Administrator Interpretations Letter, supra note 174.
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DOL policies will result in a more business-friendly environment in the near
future. If such a result occurs, the general contractor, by entering into a shorter
five-year contract with the subcontractor, would be able to avoid the extra
oversight costs for the last five years of the originally planned ten-year
contract.
B.

Uniformity

Moreover, the Salinas standard impairs large corporations' ability to
operate uniformly, both inside and outside of the Fourth Circuit, because this
decision leads to a circuit split regarding joint employment. Large
corporations often set companywide policies and procedures because business
structures often make it "impractical or impossible ... to adopt different
contractual arrangements in different circuits." 7 7 Consequently, in order for
large corporations to comply with the Salinas standard and maintain
companywide procedures, they may be forced to adopt procedures to comply
with the joint employment standard set by the Fourth Circuit.
On the same day as the Salinas decision, the Fourth Circuit applied its
new test to a similar FLSA joint employment case, which illustrated how
Salinas threatens uniformity in employment practices for large businesses. 178
In Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, the Fourth Circuit reversed a district court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of the defendant company.1 79 DIRECTV, the
largest satellite television provider in the nation, routinely contracted with
intermediary entities, or subcontractors, for installation services. 10 These
subcontractors then directly hired technicians across the country to install
DIRECTV's products for its customers.'' The plaintiffs, who worked as
installation technicians for DIRECTV's subcontractors, brought a joint
employment suit under the FLSA, claiming that they did not receive overtime
pay despite working in excess of forty hours weekly.18 2
Applying the Salinas factors, the court held in favor of the plaintiffs,
reasoning that DIRECTV "dictated nearly every aspect of [the] Plaintiffs'
work through its agreements with the various providers that directly employed
[the] technicians."' 83 This case shows the indirect and negative effects that

177. Br. of U.S. Chamber of Commerce, HR Policy Ass'n et al. in Supp. of Pet'rs at 12,
DIRECTV, LLC v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 635 (July 6, 2017) (No. 16-1449) [hereinafter Brief II].
178. See Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 767-69 (4th Cir. 2017).
179. Id. at 779.
180. Id. at 761.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 763.
183. Id. at 762.
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Salinas may have on uniformity in large companies. 8 4 Specifically,
companies that operate throughout the United States may be forced to comply
with the Fourth Circuit's new joint employment standard to maintain
consistent companywide policies and procedures. 185
C.

TraditionalBusiness Relationships

Traditional business relationships, such as franchise, independent
contracting, and third-party arrangements, face the toughest challenges in
light of the Salinas decision; the court even recognized how their decision will
undermine many of these relationships.' 86 Salinas extended potential joint
employer liability under the FLSA to disputes involving independent
contractor relationships, which detrimentally affects businesses located and/or
operating within the Fourth Circuit. These disputes, where neither putative
employer actually employs a worker, have traditionally not been a threat to
businesses because joint employer liability formerly required a finding that a
worker was an employee of at least one of the entities.
The Fourth Circuit's decision to change the common law joint
employment test-initially focusing on whether the relationship between the
putative joint employers renders the worker an employee rather than an
independent contractor-is likely based on a flawed interpretation of 29
C.F.R. § 791.2. The court states that "any joint employment inquiry must
begin with the Department of Labor's regulations, which distinguish between
'separate' employment when two persons or entities are 'entirely
independent' with respect to a worker's employment-and 'joint'
employment when the two persons or entities are 'not completely
disassociated."" 7 In this excerpt, the court uses the phrase "a worker's
employment" in order to reason that an employee-employer relationship has
not already been established; however, this is in stark contrast to what the
regulation actually states. In fact, the regulation does not use the word
'worker' at all and refers to the hypothetical individual as an 'employee'
throughout. 8 8 Therefore, by implying that under the regulation, an employeeemployer relationship may not already exist between the individual and at

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See Brief II, supra note 177, at 12-13.
Id
See Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 143-44 (4th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 141 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (2018) (emphasis added)).
See 29 C.F.R § 791.2.
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least one of the employers, the court incorrectly extended joint employment
liability to independent contracting relationships. 8 9
Extending liability to independent contracting relationships will increase
costs for businesses in one of two ways. First, businesses may elect to continue
these relationships, risking joint employment liability under the FLSA and
costs associated with such litigation. Alternatively, businesses may elect to
avoid liability by hiring employees for jobs previously performed by
independent contractors. The latter option will decrease efficiency and
flexibility for businesses because many independent contracting relationships
involve temporary and project-specific tasks. Businesses may also incur more
costs associated with the recruiting, hiring, and paying of benefits to full-time
employees. Finally, allowing independent contractors to bring a joint
employment claim under the FLSA may increase litigation costs for
businesses having to defend their relationships with another putative joint
employer.
Franchising is another traditional business relationship that appears to be
jeopardized by Salinas. A customary franchise scheme "operates under a
marketing plan or system as designed and prescribed by the franchisor."' 90 In
order for the franchisee to take advantage of the franchisor's successful
business model, the franchisee needs guidance to adhere to that model.191
Thus, almost all franchising relationships require the franchisor to have at
least some degree of control over the franchisee. 192
The Fourth Circuit's low threshold for joint employment liability under
the FLSA, specifically the court's "not completely disassociated" language,1 93
threatens franchise relationships because of the inherent control aspect of
these relationships. Franchisors are left with a difficult strategic decision.
They can either risk joint employment liability by controlling the franchisee
or risk diminution of their brand by exerting minimal control.1 94 If franchisors
elect to risk liability, franchisees may see a spike in "franchise fees/royalties
and insurance premiums."1 95 On the other hand, if they elect to limit control,

189. See Murphy v. Heartshare Human Servs. of N.Y., 254 F. Supp. 3d 392, 397-98
(E.D.N.Y. 2017) (interpreting the 1958 DOL regulation to require an employee-employer
relationship before two entities can be held liable).
190. JointEmployer Liability:How Many Employees Does an Employer Have?, AM. BAR
Ass'N (Apr. 21, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
labor-law/cle materials/LL 1604JELMaterials.authcheckdam.pdf.
191. Id.
192. See id.
193. See Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 139 (4th Cir. 2017).
194. Joint Employer Liability: How Many Employees Does An Employer Have?, supra
note 190.
195. Id.
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the entire franchise model may fail, the company's brand may diminish, and
the overall value of the company may decrease.' 9 6 Thus, the Salinas decision
has exacerbated concerns over the effects that it will have on the traditional
franchise model, particularly franchise relationships within the Fourth Circuit.
V.

CONCLUSION

In short, the Fourth Circuit's expansive joint employer test-adopted in
Salinas v. Commercial Interiors will completely change how courts within
the Fourth Circuit decide these disputes, departing from a common approach
adopted by every other circuit in the United States. The Salinas court adopted
a horizontal joint employment approach by focusing the overall inquiry on the
relationship between the putative joint employers instead of the relationship
between a worker and one putative employer. 9 7 This analytical changealong with the court's reliance on the "not completely disassociated" language
from the DOL regulation-appears to establish an unprecedently low
standard, and may hurt business practices both within and outside of the
Fourth Circuit. Salinas hurts business practices because its low and unclear
threshold leads to unpredictably for business decision-making and threatens
to destabilize many traditional business relationships throughout the states of
the Fourth Circuit.

196. See id.
197. See Salinas, 848 F.3d at 140-42.
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